Albirew/nyaa-pantsu
Albirew
/
nyaa-pantsu
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* Merge remote-tracking branch 'refs/remotes/origin/dev' into fix-for-csrf

Fix CSRF protection

Seems like it doesn't work anymore...
I tried to
fix it but couldn't get /api without csrf. So I changed the
dependency
for another csrf package (nosurf).
Behavior: Same as previously. You
just have to include the block
csrf_token

* changing dependency to nosurf
Cette révision appartient à :
akuma06 2017-06-05 03:33:48 +02:00 révisé par ewhal
Parent 75528da943
révision 38a55e88e9
28 fichiers modifiés avec 902 ajouts et 1221 suppressions

10
Godeps/Godeps.json générée
Voir le fichier

@ -173,11 +173,6 @@
"Comment": "v1.1-7-g08b5f42",
"Rev": "08b5f424b9271eedf6f9f0ce86cb9396ed337a42"
},
{
"ImportPath": "github.com/gorilla/csrf",
"Comment": "v1.5-4-ge6dca67",
"Rev": "e6dca6753d92320b18aaf5d4682691b96f7b4564"
},
{
"ImportPath": "github.com/gorilla/handlers",
"Comment": "v1.2-4-g13d7309",
@ -207,6 +202,11 @@
"ImportPath": "github.com/jinzhu/inflection",
"Rev": "1c35d901db3da928c72a72d8458480cc9ade058f"
},
{
"ImportPath": "github.com/justinas/nosurf",
"Comment": "0.1-68-g8e15682",
"Rev": "8e15682772641a1e39c431233e6a9338a32def32"
},
{
"ImportPath": "github.com/lib/pq",
"Comment": "go1.0-cutoff-166-g2704adc",

Voir le fichier

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func RunServer(conf *config.Config) {
// TODO Use config from cli
os.Mkdir(router.GPGPublicKeyPath, 700)
http.Handle("/", router.Router)
http.Handle("/", router.CSRFRouter)
// Set up server,
srv := &http.Server{

Voir le fichier

@ -3,16 +3,18 @@ package router
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/NyaaPantsu/nyaa/config"
"github.com/NyaaPantsu/nyaa/service/captcha"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"github.com/gorilla/handlers"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/justinas/nosurf"
)
// Router variable for exporting the route configuration
var Router *mux.Router
// CSRFRouter : CSRF protection for Router variable for exporting the route configuration
var CSRFRouter *nosurf.CSRFHandler
func init() {
// Static file handlers
cssHandler := http.FileServer(http.Dir("./public/css/"))
@ -86,17 +88,6 @@ func init() {
userRoutes.HandleFunc("/{id}/{username}/feed", RSSHandler).Name("feed_user")
userRoutes.HandleFunc("/{id}/{username}/feed/{page}", RSSHandler).Name("feed_user_page")
// Please make EnableSecureCSRF to false when testing locally
if config.Conf.EnableSecureCSRF {
userRoutes.Handle("/", csrf.Protect(config.CSRFTokenHashKey)(userRoutes))
torrentRoutes.Handle("/", csrf.Protect(config.CSRFTokenHashKey)(torrentRoutes))
torrentViewRoutes.Handle("/", csrf.Protect(config.CSRFTokenHashKey)(torrentViewRoutes))
} else {
userRoutes.Handle("/", csrf.Protect(config.CSRFTokenHashKey, csrf.Secure(false))(userRoutes))
torrentRoutes.Handle("/", csrf.Protect(config.CSRFTokenHashKey, csrf.Secure(false))(torrentRoutes))
torrentViewRoutes.Handle("/", csrf.Protect(config.CSRFTokenHashKey, csrf.Secure(false))(torrentViewRoutes))
}
// We don't need CSRF here
api := Router.PathPrefix("/api").Subrouter()
api.Handle("", wrapHandler(gzipAPIHandler)).Methods("GET")
@ -152,4 +143,10 @@ func init() {
Router.HandleFunc("/settings", ChangePublicSettingsHandler).Methods("POST").Name("see_languages")
Router.NotFoundHandler = http.HandlerFunc(NotFoundHandler)
CSRFRouter = nosurf.New(Router)
CSRFRouter.ExemptPath("/api")
CSRFRouter.ExemptPath("/mod")
CSRFRouter.ExemptPath("/upload")
CSRFRouter.ExemptPath("/user/login")
}

Voir le fichier

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package router
import (
"html/template"
"net/http"
"net/url"
@ -12,8 +11,8 @@ import (
userForms "github.com/NyaaPantsu/nyaa/service/user/form"
"github.com/NyaaPantsu/nyaa/util/filelist"
"github.com/NyaaPantsu/nyaa/util/publicSettings"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/justinas/nosurf"
)
/* Each Page should have an object to pass to their own template
@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ type commonTemplateVariables struct {
User *model.User
URL *url.URL // for parsing URL in templates
Route *mux.Route // for getting current route in templates
CsrfField template.HTML
CsrfToken string
Config *config.Config
}
@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ func newCommonVariables(r *http.Request) commonTemplateVariables {
User: getUser(r),
URL: r.URL,
Route: mux.CurrentRoute(r),
CsrfField: csrf.TemplateField(r),
CsrfToken: nosurf.Token(r),
Config: config.Conf,
}
}

Voir le fichier

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{{ define "csrf_field"}}
{{$.CsrfField}}
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ .CsrfToken }}">
{{end}}

Voir le fichier

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
language: go
sudo: false
matrix:
include:
- go: 1.2
- go: 1.3
- go: 1.4
- go: 1.5
- go: 1.6
- go: tip
allow_failures:
- go: tip
install:
- # skip
script:
- go get -t -v ./...
- diff -u <(echo -n) <(gofmt -d .)
- go vet $(go list ./... | grep -v /vendor/)
- go test -v -race ./...

Voir le fichier

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
Copyright (c) 2015, Matt Silverlock (matt@eatsleeprepeat.net) All rights
reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or
other materials provided with the distribution.
3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors
may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON
ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

Voir le fichier

@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
# gorilla/csrf
[![GoDoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/gorilla/csrf?status.svg)](https://godoc.org/github.com/gorilla/csrf) [![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/gorilla/csrf.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.org/gorilla/csrf) [![Sourcegraph](https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/gorilla/csrf/-/badge.svg)](https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/gorilla/csrf?badge)
gorilla/csrf is a HTTP middleware library that provides [cross-site request
forgery](http://blog.codinghorror.com/preventing-csrf-and-xsrf-attacks/) (CSRF)
protection. It includes:
* The `csrf.Protect` middleware/handler provides CSRF protection on routes
attached to a router or a sub-router.
* A `csrf.Token` function that provides the token to pass into your response,
whether that be a HTML form or a JSON response body.
* ... and a `csrf.TemplateField` helper that you can pass into your `html/template`
templates to replace a `{{ .csrfField }}` template tag with a hidden input
field.
gorilla/csrf is designed to work with any Go web framework, including:
* The [Gorilla](http://www.gorillatoolkit.org/) toolkit
* Go's built-in [net/http](http://golang.org/pkg/net/http/) package
* [Goji](https://goji.io) - see the [tailored fork](https://github.com/goji/csrf)
* [Gin](https://github.com/gin-gonic/gin)
* [Echo](https://github.com/labstack/echo)
* ... and any other router/framework that rallies around Go's `http.Handler` interface.
gorilla/csrf is also compatible with middleware 'helper' libraries like
[Alice](https://github.com/justinas/alice) and [Negroni](https://github.com/codegangsta/negroni).
## Install
With a properly configured Go toolchain:
```sh
go get github.com/gorilla/csrf
```
## Examples
* [HTML Forms](#html-forms)
* [JavaScript Apps](#javascript-applications)
* [Google App Engine](#google-app-engine)
* [Setting Options](#setting-options)
gorilla/csrf is easy to use: add the middleware to your router with
the below:
```go
CSRF := csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))
http.ListenAndServe(":8000", CSRF(r))
```
...and then collect the token with `csrf.Token(r)` in your handlers before
passing it to the template, JSON body or HTTP header (see below).
Note that the authentication key passed to `csrf.Protect([]byte(key))` should be
32-bytes long and persist across application restarts. Generating a random key
won't allow you to authenticate existing cookies and will break your CSRF
validation.
gorilla/csrf inspects the HTTP headers (first) and form body (second) on
subsequent POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE/etc. requests for the token.
### HTML Forms
Here's the common use-case: HTML forms you want to provide CSRF protection for,
in order to protect malicious POST requests being made:
```go
package main
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
)
func main() {
r := mux.NewRouter()
r.HandleFunc("/signup", ShowSignupForm)
// All POST requests without a valid token will return HTTP 403 Forbidden.
r.HandleFunc("/signup/post", SubmitSignupForm)
// Add the middleware to your router by wrapping it.
http.ListenAndServe(":8000",
csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))(r))
// PS: Don't forget to pass csrf.Secure(false) if you're developing locally
// over plain HTTP (just don't leave it on in production).
}
func ShowSignupForm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// signup_form.tmpl just needs a {{ .csrfField }} template tag for
// csrf.TemplateField to inject the CSRF token into. Easy!
t.ExecuteTemplate(w, "signup_form.tmpl", map[string]interface{}{
csrf.TemplateTag: csrf.TemplateField(r),
})
// We could also retrieve the token directly from csrf.Token(r) and
// set it in the request header - w.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", token)
// This is useful if you're sending JSON to clients or a front-end JavaScript
// framework.
}
func SubmitSignupForm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// We can trust that requests making it this far have satisfied
// our CSRF protection requirements.
}
```
Note that the CSRF middleware will (by necessity) consume the request body if the
token is passed via POST form values. If you need to consume this in your
handler, insert your own middleware earlier in the chain to capture the request
body.
### JavaScript Applications
This approach is useful if you're using a front-end JavaScript framework like
React, Ember or Angular, or are providing a JSON API.
We'll also look at applying selective CSRF protection using
[gorilla/mux's](http://www.gorillatoolkit.org/pkg/mux) sub-routers,
as we don't handle any POST/PUT/DELETE requests with our top-level router.
```go
package main
import (
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
)
func main() {
r := mux.NewRouter()
api := r.PathPrefix("/api").Subrouter()
api.HandleFunc("/user/{id}", GetUser).Methods("GET")
http.ListenAndServe(":8000",
csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))(r))
}
func GetUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Authenticate the request, get the id from the route params,
// and fetch the user from the DB, etc.
// Get the token and pass it in the CSRF header. Our JSON-speaking client
// or JavaScript framework can now read the header and return the token in
// in its own "X-CSRF-Token" request header on the subsequent POST.
w.Header().Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf.Token(r))
b, err := json.Marshal(user)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
return
}
w.Write(b)
}
```
### Google App Engine
If you're using [Google App
Engine](https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/go/how-requests-are-handled#Go_Requests_and_HTTP),
which doesn't allow you to hook into the default `http.ServeMux` directly,
you can still use gorilla/csrf (and gorilla/mux):
```go
package app
// Remember: appengine has its own package main
func init() {
r := mux.NewRouter()
r.HandleFunc("/", IndexHandler)
// ...
// We pass our CSRF-protected router to the DefaultServeMux
http.Handle("/", csrf.Protect([]byte(your-key))(r))
}
```
### Setting Options
What about providing your own error handler and changing the HTTP header the
package inspects on requests? (i.e. an existing API you're porting to Go). Well,
gorilla/csrf provides options for changing these as you see fit:
```go
func main() {
CSRF := csrf.Protect(
[]byte("a-32-byte-long-key-goes-here"),
csrf.RequestHeader("Authenticity-Token"),
csrf.FieldName("authenticity_token"),
csrf.ErrorHandler(http.HandlerFunc(serverError(403))),
)
r := mux.NewRouter()
r.HandleFunc("/signup", GetSignupForm)
r.HandleFunc("/signup/post", PostSignupForm)
http.ListenAndServe(":8000", CSRF(r))
}
```
Not too bad, right?
If there's something you're confused about or a feature you would like to see
added, open an issue.
## Design Notes
Getting CSRF protection right is important, so here's some background:
* This library generates unique-per-request (masked) tokens as a mitigation
against the [BREACH attack](http://breachattack.com/).
* The 'base' (unmasked) token is stored in the session, which means that
multiple browser tabs won't cause a user problems as their per-request token
is compared with the base token.
* Operates on a "whitelist only" approach where safe (non-mutating) HTTP methods
(GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE) are the *only* methods where token validation is not
enforced.
* The design is based on the battle-tested
[Django](https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.8/ref/csrf/) and [Ruby on
Rails](http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionController/RequestForgeryProtection.html)
approaches.
* Cookies are authenticated and based on the [securecookie](https://github.com/gorilla/securecookie)
library. They're also Secure (issued over HTTPS only) and are HttpOnly
by default, because sane defaults are important.
* Go's `crypto/rand` library is used to generate the 32 byte (256 bit) tokens
and the one-time-pad used for masking them.
This library does not seek to be adventurous.
## License
BSD licensed. See the LICENSE file for details.

Voir le fichier

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
// +build go1.7
package csrf
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
func contextGet(r *http.Request, key string) (interface{}, error) {
val := r.Context().Value(key)
if val == nil {
return nil, errors.Errorf("no value exists in the context for key %q", key)
}
return val, nil
}
func contextSave(r *http.Request, key string, val interface{}) *http.Request {
ctx := r.Context()
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, key, val)
return r.WithContext(ctx)
}
func contextClear(r *http.Request) {
// no-op for go1.7+
}

Voir le fichier

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
// +build !go1.7
package csrf
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/context"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
func contextGet(r *http.Request, key string) (interface{}, error) {
if val, ok := context.GetOk(r, key); ok {
return val, nil
}
return nil, errors.Errorf("no value exists in the context for key %q", key)
}
func contextSave(r *http.Request, key string, val interface{}) *http.Request {
context.Set(r, key, val)
return r
}
func contextClear(r *http.Request) {
context.Clear(r)
}

Voir le fichier

@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
package csrf
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/gorilla/securecookie"
)
// CSRF token length in bytes.
const tokenLength = 32
// Context/session keys & prefixes
const (
tokenKey string = "gorilla.csrf.Token"
formKey string = "gorilla.csrf.Form"
errorKey string = "gorilla.csrf.Error"
skipCheckKey string = "gorilla.csrf.Skip"
cookieName string = "_gorilla_csrf"
errorPrefix string = "gorilla/csrf: "
)
var (
// The name value used in form fields.
fieldName = tokenKey
// defaultAge sets the default MaxAge for cookies.
defaultAge = 3600 * 12
// The default HTTP request header to inspect
headerName = "X-CSRF-Token"
// Idempotent (safe) methods as defined by RFC7231 section 4.2.2.
safeMethods = []string{"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"}
)
// TemplateTag provides a default template tag - e.g. {{ .csrfField }} - for use
// with the TemplateField function.
var TemplateTag = "csrfField"
var (
// ErrNoReferer is returned when a HTTPS request provides an empty Referer
// header.
ErrNoReferer = errors.New("referer not supplied")
// ErrBadReferer is returned when the scheme & host in the URL do not match
// the supplied Referer header.
ErrBadReferer = errors.New("referer invalid")
// ErrNoToken is returned if no CSRF token is supplied in the request.
ErrNoToken = errors.New("CSRF token not found in request")
// ErrBadToken is returned if the CSRF token in the request does not match
// the token in the session, or is otherwise malformed.
ErrBadToken = errors.New("CSRF token invalid")
)
type csrf struct {
h http.Handler
sc *securecookie.SecureCookie
st store
opts options
}
// options contains the optional settings for the CSRF middleware.
type options struct {
MaxAge int
Domain string
Path string
// Note that the function and field names match the case of the associated
// http.Cookie field instead of the "correct" HTTPOnly name that golint suggests.
HttpOnly bool
Secure bool
RequestHeader string
FieldName string
ErrorHandler http.Handler
CookieName string
}
// Protect is HTTP middleware that provides Cross-Site Request Forgery
// protection.
//
// It securely generates a masked (unique-per-request) token that
// can be embedded in the HTTP response (e.g. form field or HTTP header).
// The original (unmasked) token is stored in the session, which is inaccessible
// by an attacker (provided you are using HTTPS). Subsequent requests are
// expected to include this token, which is compared against the session token.
// Requests that do not provide a matching token are served with a HTTP 403
// 'Forbidden' error response.
//
// Example:
// package main
//
// import (
// "html/template"
//
// "github.com/gorilla/csrf"
// "github.com/gorilla/mux"
// )
//
// var t = template.Must(template.New("signup_form.tmpl").Parse(form))
//
// func main() {
// r := mux.NewRouter()
//
// r.HandleFunc("/signup", GetSignupForm)
// // POST requests without a valid token will return a HTTP 403 Forbidden.
// r.HandleFunc("/signup/post", PostSignupForm)
//
// // Add the middleware to your router.
// http.ListenAndServe(":8000",
// // Note that the authentication key provided should be 32 bytes
// // long and persist across application restarts.
// csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))(r))
// }
//
// func GetSignupForm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// // signup_form.tmpl just needs a {{ .csrfField }} template tag for
// // csrf.TemplateField to inject the CSRF token into. Easy!
// t.ExecuteTemplate(w, "signup_form.tmpl", map[string]interface{}{
// csrf.TemplateTag: csrf.TemplateField(r),
// })
// // We could also retrieve the token directly from csrf.Token(r) and
// // set it in the request header - w.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", token)
// // This is useful if you're sending JSON to clients or a front-end JavaScript
// // framework.
// }
//
func Protect(authKey []byte, opts ...Option) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
cs := parseOptions(h, opts...)
// Set the defaults if no options have been specified
if cs.opts.ErrorHandler == nil {
cs.opts.ErrorHandler = http.HandlerFunc(unauthorizedHandler)
}
if cs.opts.MaxAge < 0 {
// Default of 12 hours
cs.opts.MaxAge = defaultAge
}
if cs.opts.FieldName == "" {
cs.opts.FieldName = fieldName
}
if cs.opts.CookieName == "" {
cs.opts.CookieName = cookieName
}
if cs.opts.RequestHeader == "" {
cs.opts.RequestHeader = headerName
}
// Create an authenticated securecookie instance.
if cs.sc == nil {
cs.sc = securecookie.New(authKey, nil)
// Use JSON serialization (faster than one-off gob encoding)
cs.sc.SetSerializer(securecookie.JSONEncoder{})
// Set the MaxAge of the underlying securecookie.
cs.sc.MaxAge(cs.opts.MaxAge)
}
if cs.st == nil {
// Default to the cookieStore
cs.st = &cookieStore{
name: cs.opts.CookieName,
maxAge: cs.opts.MaxAge,
secure: cs.opts.Secure,
httpOnly: cs.opts.HttpOnly,
path: cs.opts.Path,
domain: cs.opts.Domain,
sc: cs.sc,
}
}
return cs
}
}
// Implements http.Handler for the csrf type.
func (cs *csrf) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Skip the check if directed to. This should always be a bool.
if val, err := contextGet(r, skipCheckKey); err == nil {
if skip, ok := val.(bool); ok {
if skip {
cs.h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
}
}
// Retrieve the token from the session.
// An error represents either a cookie that failed HMAC validation
// or that doesn't exist.
realToken, err := cs.st.Get(r)
if err != nil || len(realToken) != tokenLength {
// If there was an error retrieving the token, the token doesn't exist
// yet, or it's the wrong length, generate a new token.
// Note that the new token will (correctly) fail validation downstream
// as it will no longer match the request token.
realToken, err = generateRandomBytes(tokenLength)
if err != nil {
r = envError(r, err)
cs.opts.ErrorHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Save the new (real) token in the session store.
err = cs.st.Save(realToken, w)
if err != nil {
r = envError(r, err)
cs.opts.ErrorHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
}
// Save the masked token to the request context
r = contextSave(r, tokenKey, mask(realToken, r))
// Save the field name to the request context
r = contextSave(r, formKey, cs.opts.FieldName)
// HTTP methods not defined as idempotent ("safe") under RFC7231 require
// inspection.
if !contains(safeMethods, r.Method) {
// Enforce an origin check for HTTPS connections. As per the Django CSRF
// implementation (https://goo.gl/vKA7GE) the Referer header is almost
// always present for same-domain HTTP requests.
if r.URL.Scheme == "https" {
// Fetch the Referer value. Call the error handler if it's empty or
// otherwise fails to parse.
referer, err := url.Parse(r.Referer())
if err != nil || referer.String() == "" {
r = envError(r, ErrNoReferer)
cs.opts.ErrorHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
if sameOrigin(r.URL, referer) == false {
r = envError(r, ErrBadReferer)
cs.opts.ErrorHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
}
// If the token returned from the session store is nil for non-idempotent
// ("unsafe") methods, call the error handler.
if realToken == nil {
r = envError(r, ErrNoToken)
cs.opts.ErrorHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Retrieve the combined token (pad + masked) token and unmask it.
requestToken := unmask(cs.requestToken(r))
// Compare the request token against the real token
if !compareTokens(requestToken, realToken) {
r = envError(r, ErrBadToken)
cs.opts.ErrorHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
}
// Set the Vary: Cookie header to protect clients from caching the response.
w.Header().Add("Vary", "Cookie")
// Call the wrapped handler/router on success.
cs.h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
// Clear the request context after the handler has completed.
contextClear(r)
}
// unauthorizedhandler sets a HTTP 403 Forbidden status and writes the
// CSRF failure reason to the response.
func unauthorizedHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("%s - %s",
http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), FailureReason(r)),
http.StatusForbidden)
return
}

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/*
Package csrf (gorilla/csrf) provides Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
prevention middleware for Go web applications & services.
It includes:
* The `csrf.Protect` middleware/handler provides CSRF protection on routes
attached to a router or a sub-router.
* A `csrf.Token` function that provides the token to pass into your response,
whether that be a HTML form or a JSON response body.
* ... and a `csrf.TemplateField` helper that you can pass into your `html/template`
templates to replace a `{{ .csrfField }}` template tag with a hidden input
field.
gorilla/csrf is easy to use: add the middleware to individual handlers with
the below:
CSRF := csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))
http.HandlerFunc("/route", CSRF(YourHandler))
... and then collect the token with `csrf.Token(r)` before passing it to the
template, JSON body or HTTP header (you pick!). gorilla/csrf inspects the form body
(first) and HTTP headers (second) on subsequent POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE/etc. requests
for the token.
Note that the authentication key passed to `csrf.Protect([]byte(key))` should be
32-bytes long and persist across application restarts. Generating a random key
won't allow you to authenticate existing cookies and will break your CSRF
validation.
Here's the common use-case: HTML forms you want to provide CSRF protection for,
in order to protect malicious POST requests being made:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
)
var form = `
<html>
<head>
<title>Sign Up!</title>
</head>
<body>
<form method="POST" action="/signup/post" accept-charset="UTF-8">
<input type="text" name="name">
<input type="text" name="email">
<!--
The default template tag used by the CSRF middleware .
This will be replaced with a hidden <input> field containing the
masked CSRF token.
-->
{{ .csrfField }}
<input type="submit" value="Sign up!">
</form>
</body>
</html>
`
var t = template.Must(template.New("signup_form.tmpl").Parse(form))
func main() {
r := mux.NewRouter()
r.HandleFunc("/signup", ShowSignupForm)
// All POST requests without a valid token will return HTTP 403 Forbidden.
r.HandleFunc("/signup/post", SubmitSignupForm)
// Add the middleware to your router by wrapping it.
http.ListenAndServe(":8000",
csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))(r))
// PS: Don't forget to pass csrf.Secure(false) if you're developing locally
// over plain HTTP (just don't leave it on in production).
}
func ShowSignupForm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// signup_form.tmpl just needs a {{ .csrfField }} template tag for
// csrf.TemplateField to inject the CSRF token into. Easy!
t.ExecuteTemplate(w, "signup_form.tmpl", map[string]interface{}{
csrf.TemplateTag: csrf.TemplateField(r),
})
}
func SubmitSignupForm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// We can trust that requests making it this far have satisfied
// our CSRF protection requirements.
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%v\n", r.PostForm)
}
Note that the CSRF middleware will (by necessity) consume the request body if the
token is passed via POST form values. If you need to consume this in your
handler, insert your own middleware earlier in the chain to capture the request
body.
You can also send the CSRF token in the response header. This approach is useful
if you're using a front-end JavaScript framework like Ember or Angular, or are
providing a JSON API:
package main
import (
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
)
func main() {
r := mux.NewRouter()
api := r.PathPrefix("/api").Subrouter()
api.HandleFunc("/user/:id", GetUser).Methods("GET")
http.ListenAndServe(":8000",
csrf.Protect([]byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"))(r))
}
func GetUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Authenticate the request, get the id from the route params,
// and fetch the user from the DB, etc.
// Get the token and pass it in the CSRF header. Our JSON-speaking client
// or JavaScript framework can now read the header and return the token in
// in its own "X-CSRF-Token" request header on the subsequent POST.
w.Header().Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf.Token(r))
b, err := json.Marshal(user)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
return
}
w.Write(b)
}
If you're writing a client that's supposed to mimic browser behavior, make sure to
send back the CSRF cookie (the default name is _gorilla_csrf, but this can be changed
with the CookieName Option) along with either the X-CSRF-Token header or the gorilla.csrf.Token form field.
In addition: getting CSRF protection right is important, so here's some background:
* This library generates unique-per-request (masked) tokens as a mitigation
against the [BREACH attack](http://breachattack.com/).
* The 'base' (unmasked) token is stored in the session, which means that
multiple browser tabs won't cause a user problems as their per-request token
is compared with the base token.
* Operates on a "whitelist only" approach where safe (non-mutating) HTTP methods
(GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE) are the *only* methods where token validation is not
enforced.
* The design is based on the battle-tested
[Django](https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.8/ref/csrf/) and [Ruby on
Rails](http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionController/RequestForgeryProtection.html)
approaches.
* Cookies are authenticated and based on the [securecookie](https://github.com/gorilla/securecookie)
library. They're also Secure (issued over HTTPS only) and are HttpOnly
by default, because sane defaults are important.
* Go's `crypto/rand` library is used to generate the 32 byte (256 bit) tokens
and the one-time-pad used for masking them.
This library does not seek to be adventurous.
*/
package csrf

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package csrf
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"net/url"
)
// Token returns a masked CSRF token ready for passing into HTML template or
// a JSON response body. An empty token will be returned if the middleware
// has not been applied (which will fail subsequent validation).
func Token(r *http.Request) string {
if val, err := contextGet(r, tokenKey); err == nil {
if maskedToken, ok := val.(string); ok {
return maskedToken
}
}
return ""
}
// FailureReason makes CSRF validation errors available in the request context.
// This is useful when you want to log the cause of the error or report it to
// client.
func FailureReason(r *http.Request) error {
if val, err := contextGet(r, errorKey); err == nil {
if err, ok := val.(error); ok {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// UnsafeSkipCheck will skip the CSRF check for any requests. This must be
// called before the CSRF middleware.
//
// Note: You should not set this without otherwise securing the request from
// CSRF attacks. The primary use-case for this function is to turn off CSRF
// checks for non-browser clients using authorization tokens against your API.
func UnsafeSkipCheck(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
return contextSave(r, skipCheckKey, true)
}
// TemplateField is a template helper for html/template that provides an <input> field
// populated with a CSRF token.
//
// Example:
//
// // The following tag in our form.tmpl template:
// {{ .csrfField }}
//
// // ... becomes:
// <input type="hidden" name="gorilla.csrf.Token" value="<token>">
//
func TemplateField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
if name, err := contextGet(r, formKey); err == nil {
fragment := fmt.Sprintf(`<input type="hidden" name="%s" value="%s">`,
name, Token(r))
return template.HTML(fragment)
}
return template.HTML("")
}
// mask returns a unique-per-request token to mitigate the BREACH attack
// as per http://breachattack.com/#mitigations
//
// The token is generated by XOR'ing a one-time-pad and the base (session) CSRF
// token and returning them together as a 64-byte slice. This effectively
// randomises the token on a per-request basis without breaking multiple browser
// tabs/windows.
func mask(realToken []byte, r *http.Request) string {
otp, err := generateRandomBytes(tokenLength)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
// XOR the OTP with the real token to generate a masked token. Append the
// OTP to the front of the masked token to allow unmasking in the subsequent
// request.
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(append(otp, xorToken(otp, realToken)...))
}
// unmask splits the issued token (one-time-pad + masked token) and returns the
// unmasked request token for comparison.
func unmask(issued []byte) []byte {
// Issued tokens are always masked and combined with the pad.
if len(issued) != tokenLength*2 {
return nil
}
// We now know the length of the byte slice.
otp := issued[tokenLength:]
masked := issued[:tokenLength]
// Unmask the token by XOR'ing it against the OTP used to mask it.
return xorToken(otp, masked)
}
// requestToken returns the issued token (pad + masked token) from the HTTP POST
// body or HTTP header. It will return nil if the token fails to decode.
func (cs *csrf) requestToken(r *http.Request) []byte {
// 1. Check the HTTP header first.
issued := r.Header.Get(cs.opts.RequestHeader)
// 2. Fall back to the POST (form) value.
if issued == "" {
issued = r.PostFormValue(cs.opts.FieldName)
}
// 3. Finally, fall back to the multipart form (if set).
if issued == "" && r.MultipartForm != nil {
vals := r.MultipartForm.Value[cs.opts.FieldName]
if len(vals) > 0 {
issued = vals[0]
}
}
// Decode the "issued" (pad + masked) token sent in the request. Return a
// nil byte slice on a decoding error (this will fail upstream).
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(issued)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return decoded
}
// generateRandomBytes returns securely generated random bytes.
// It will return an error if the system's secure random number generator
// fails to function correctly.
func generateRandomBytes(n int) ([]byte, error) {
b := make([]byte, n)
_, err := rand.Read(b)
// err == nil only if len(b) == n
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return b, nil
}
// sameOrigin returns true if URLs a and b share the same origin. The same
// origin is defined as host (which includes the port) and scheme.
func sameOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {
return (a.Scheme == b.Scheme && a.Host == b.Host)
}
// compare securely (constant-time) compares the unmasked token from the request
// against the real token from the session.
func compareTokens(a, b []byte) bool {
// This is required as subtle.ConstantTimeCompare does not check for equal
// lengths in Go versions prior to 1.3.
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(a, b) == 1
}
// xorToken XORs tokens ([]byte) to provide unique-per-request CSRF tokens. It
// will return a masked token if the base token is XOR'ed with a one-time-pad.
// An unmasked token will be returned if a masked token is XOR'ed with the
// one-time-pad used to mask it.
func xorToken(a, b []byte) []byte {
n := len(a)
if len(b) < n {
n = len(b)
}
res := make([]byte, n)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
res[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]
}
return res
}
// contains is a helper function to check if a string exists in a slice - e.g.
// whether a HTTP method exists in a list of safe methods.
func contains(vals []string, s string) bool {
for _, v := range vals {
if v == s {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// envError stores a CSRF error in the request context.
func envError(r *http.Request, err error) *http.Request {
return contextSave(r, errorKey, err)
}

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package csrf
import "net/http"
// Option describes a functional option for configuring the CSRF handler.
type Option func(*csrf)
// MaxAge sets the maximum age (in seconds) of a CSRF token's underlying cookie.
// Defaults to 12 hours.
func MaxAge(age int) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.MaxAge = age
}
}
// Domain sets the cookie domain. Defaults to the current domain of the request
// only (recommended).
//
// This should be a hostname and not a URL. If set, the domain is treated as
// being prefixed with a '.' - e.g. "example.com" becomes ".example.com" and
// matches "www.example.com" and "secure.example.com".
func Domain(domain string) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.Domain = domain
}
}
// Path sets the cookie path. Defaults to the path the cookie was issued from
// (recommended).
//
// This instructs clients to only respond with cookie for that path and its
// subpaths - i.e. a cookie issued from "/register" would be included in requests
// to "/register/step2" and "/register/submit".
func Path(p string) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.Path = p
}
}
// Secure sets the 'Secure' flag on the cookie. Defaults to true (recommended).
// Set this to 'false' in your development environment otherwise the cookie won't
// be sent over an insecure channel. Setting this via the presence of a 'DEV'
// environmental variable is a good way of making sure this won't make it to a
// production environment.
func Secure(s bool) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.Secure = s
}
}
// HttpOnly sets the 'HttpOnly' flag on the cookie. Defaults to true (recommended).
func HttpOnly(h bool) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
// Note that the function and field names match the case of the
// related http.Cookie field instead of the "correct" HTTPOnly name
// that golint suggests.
cs.opts.HttpOnly = h
}
}
// ErrorHandler allows you to change the handler called when CSRF request
// processing encounters an invalid token or request. A typical use would be to
// provide a handler that returns a static HTML file with a HTTP 403 status. By
// default a HTTP 403 status and a plain text CSRF failure reason are served.
//
// Note that a custom error handler can also access the csrf.FailureReason(r)
// function to retrieve the CSRF validation reason from the request context.
func ErrorHandler(h http.Handler) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.ErrorHandler = h
}
}
// RequestHeader allows you to change the request header the CSRF middleware
// inspects. The default is X-CSRF-Token.
func RequestHeader(header string) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.RequestHeader = header
}
}
// FieldName allows you to change the name attribute of the hidden <input> field
// inspected by this package. The default is 'gorilla.csrf.Token'.
func FieldName(name string) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.FieldName = name
}
}
// CookieName changes the name of the CSRF cookie issued to clients.
//
// Note that cookie names should not contain whitespace, commas, semicolons,
// backslashes or control characters as per RFC6265.
func CookieName(name string) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.opts.CookieName = name
}
}
// setStore sets the store used by the CSRF middleware.
// Note: this is private (for now) to allow for internal API changes.
func setStore(s store) Option {
return func(cs *csrf) {
cs.st = s
}
}
// parseOptions parses the supplied options functions and returns a configured
// csrf handler.
func parseOptions(h http.Handler, opts ...Option) *csrf {
// Set the handler to call after processing.
cs := &csrf{
h: h,
}
// Default to true. See Secure & HttpOnly function comments for rationale.
// Set here to allow package users to override the default.
cs.opts.Secure = true
cs.opts.HttpOnly = true
// Range over each options function and apply it
// to our csrf type to configure it. Options functions are
// applied in order, with any conflicting options overriding
// earlier calls.
for _, option := range opts {
option(cs)
}
return cs
}

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package csrf
import (
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/gorilla/securecookie"
)
// store represents the session storage used for CSRF tokens.
type store interface {
// Get returns the real CSRF token from the store.
Get(*http.Request) ([]byte, error)
// Save stores the real CSRF token in the store and writes a
// cookie to the http.ResponseWriter.
// For non-cookie stores, the cookie should contain a unique (256 bit) ID
// or key that references the token in the backend store.
// csrf.GenerateRandomBytes is a helper function for generating secure IDs.
Save(token []byte, w http.ResponseWriter) error
}
// cookieStore is a signed cookie session store for CSRF tokens.
type cookieStore struct {
name string
maxAge int
secure bool
httpOnly bool
path string
domain string
sc *securecookie.SecureCookie
}
// Get retrieves a CSRF token from the session cookie. It returns an empty token
// if decoding fails (e.g. HMAC validation fails or the named cookie doesn't exist).
func (cs *cookieStore) Get(r *http.Request) ([]byte, error) {
// Retrieve the cookie from the request
cookie, err := r.Cookie(cs.name)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
token := make([]byte, tokenLength)
// Decode the HMAC authenticated cookie.
err = cs.sc.Decode(cs.name, cookie.Value, &token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return token, nil
}
// Save stores the CSRF token in the session cookie.
func (cs *cookieStore) Save(token []byte, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
// Generate an encoded cookie value with the CSRF token.
encoded, err := cs.sc.Encode(cs.name, token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cookie := &http.Cookie{
Name: cs.name,
Value: encoded,
MaxAge: cs.maxAge,
HttpOnly: cs.httpOnly,
Secure: cs.secure,
Path: cs.path,
Domain: cs.domain,
}
// Set the Expires field on the cookie based on the MaxAge
// If MaxAge <= 0, we don't set the Expires attribute, making the cookie
// session-only.
if cs.maxAge > 0 {
cookie.Expires = time.Now().Add(
time.Duration(cs.maxAge) * time.Second)
}
// Write the authenticated cookie to the response.
http.SetCookie(w, cookie)
return nil
}

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# Compiled Object files, Static and Dynamic libs (Shared Objects)
*.o
*.a
*.so
# Folders
_obj
_test
# Architecture specific extensions/prefixes
*.[568vq]
[568vq].out
*.cgo1.go
*.cgo2.c
_cgo_defun.c
_cgo_gotypes.go
_cgo_export.*
_testmain.go
*.exe
# Vim stuff
*.s[a-w][a-z]
*.un~
Session.vim
.netrwhist
*~

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language: go
install:
- go get .
script:
- go test -v .
go:
- 1.1
- 1.2
- 1.3
- 1.4
- tip

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The MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (c) 2013 Justinas Stankevicius
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of
the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so,
subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR
COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER
IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

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# nosurf
[![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/justinas/nosurf.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.org/justinas/nosurf)
[![GoDoc](http://godoc.org/github.com/justinas/nosurf?status.png)](http://godoc.org/github.com/justinas/nosurf)
`nosurf` is an HTTP package for Go
that helps you prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks.
It acts like a middleware and therefore
is compatible with basically any Go HTTP application.
### Why?
Even though CSRF is a prominent vulnerability,
Go's web-related package infrastructure mostly consists of
micro-frameworks that neither do implement CSRF checks,
nor should they.
`nosurf` solves this problem by providing a `CSRFHandler`
that wraps your `http.Handler` and checks for CSRF attacks
on every non-safe (non-GET/HEAD/OPTIONS/TRACE) method.
`nosurf` requires Go 1.1 or later.
### Features
* Supports any `http.Handler` (frameworks, your own handlers, etc.)
and acts like one itself.
* Allows exempting specific endpoints from CSRF checks by
an exact URL, a glob, or a regular expression.
* Allows specifying your own failure handler.
Want to present the hacker with an ASCII middle finger
instead of the plain old `HTTP 400`? No problem.
* Uses masked tokens to mitigate the BREACH attack.
* Has no dependencies outside the Go standard library.
### Example
```go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/justinas/nosurf"
"html/template"
"net/http"
)
var templateString string = `
<!doctype html>
<html>
<body>
{{ if .name }}
<p>Your name: {{ .name }}</p>
{{ end }}
<form action="/" method="POST">
<input type="text" name="name">
<!-- Try removing this or changing its value
and see what happens -->
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ .token }}">
<input type="submit" value="Send">
</form>
</body>
</html>
`
var templ = template.Must(template.New("t1").Parse(templateString))
func myFunc(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
context := make(map[string]string)
context["token"] = nosurf.Token(r)
if r.Method == "POST" {
context["name"] = r.FormValue("name")
}
templ.Execute(w, context)
}
func main() {
myHandler := http.HandlerFunc(myFunc)
fmt.Println("Listening on http://127.0.0.1:8000/")
http.ListenAndServe(":8000", nosurf.New(myHandler))
}
```
### Manual token verification
In some cases the CSRF token may be send through a non standard way,
e.g. a body or request is a JSON encoded message with one of the fields
being a token.
In such case the handler(path) should be excluded from an automatic
verification by using one of the exemption methods:
```go
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptFunc(fn func(r *http.Request) bool)
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptGlob(pattern string)
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptGlobs(patterns ...string)
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptPath(path string)
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptPaths(paths ...string)
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptRegexp(re interface{})
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptRegexps(res ...interface{})
```
Later on, the token **must** be verified by manually getting the token from the cookie
and providing the token sent in body through: `VerifyToken(tkn, tkn2 string) bool`.
Example:
```go
func HandleJson(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
d := struct{
X,Y int
Tkn string
}{}
json.Unmarshal(ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body), &d)
if !nosurf.VerifyToken(Token(r), d.Tkn) {
http.Errorf(w, "CSRF token incorrect", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// do smth cool
}
```
### Contributing
0. Find an issue that bugs you / open a new one.
1. Discuss.
2. Branch off, commit, test.
3. Make a pull request / attach the commits to the issue.

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// +build go1.7
package nosurf
import "net/http"
type ctxKey int
const (
nosurfKey ctxKey = iota
)
type csrfContext struct {
// The masked, base64 encoded token
// That's suitable for use in form fields, etc.
token string
// reason for the failure of CSRF check
reason error
}
// Token takes an HTTP request and returns
// the CSRF token for that request
// or an empty string if the token does not exist.
//
// Note that the token won't be available after
// CSRFHandler finishes
// (that is, in another handler that wraps it,
// or after the request has been served)
func Token(req *http.Request) string {
ctx := req.Context().Value(nosurfKey).(*csrfContext)
return ctx.token
}
// Reason takes an HTTP request and returns
// the reason of failure of the CSRF check for that request
//
// Note that the same availability restrictions apply for Reason() as for Token().
func Reason(req *http.Request) error {
ctx := req.Context().Value(nosurfKey).(*csrfContext)
return ctx.reason
}
func ctxClear(_ *http.Request) {
}
func ctxSetToken(req *http.Request, token []byte) {
ctx := req.Context().Value(nosurfKey).(*csrfContext)
ctx.token = b64encode(maskToken(token))
}
func ctxSetReason(req *http.Request, reason error) {
ctx := req.Context().Value(nosurfKey).(*csrfContext)
if ctx.token == "" {
panic("Reason should never be set when there's no token in the context yet.")
}
ctx.reason = reason
}

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vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/context_legacy.go générée externe Fichier normal
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// +build !go1.7
package nosurf
import (
"net/http"
"sync"
)
// This file implements a context similar to one found
// in gorilla/context, but tailored specifically for our use case
// and not using gorilla's package just because.
type csrfContext struct {
// The masked, base64 encoded token
// That's suitable for use in form fields, etc.
token string
// reason for the failure of CSRF check
reason error
}
var (
contextMap = make(map[*http.Request]*csrfContext)
cmMutex = new(sync.RWMutex)
)
// Token() takes an HTTP request and returns
// the CSRF token for that request
// or an empty string if the token does not exist.
//
// Note that the token won't be available after
// CSRFHandler finishes
// (that is, in another handler that wraps it,
// or after the request has been served)
func Token(req *http.Request) string {
cmMutex.RLock()
defer cmMutex.RUnlock()
ctx, ok := contextMap[req]
if !ok {
return ""
}
return ctx.token
}
// Reason() takes an HTTP request and returns
// the reason of failure of the CSRF check for that request
//
// Note that the same availability restrictions apply for Reason() as for Token().
func Reason(req *http.Request) error {
cmMutex.RLock()
defer cmMutex.RUnlock()
ctx, ok := contextMap[req]
if !ok {
return nil
}
return ctx.reason
}
// Takes a raw token, masks it with a per-request key,
// encodes in base64 and makes it available to the wrapped handler
func ctxSetToken(req *http.Request, token []byte) *http.Request {
cmMutex.Lock()
defer cmMutex.Unlock()
ctx, ok := contextMap[req]
if !ok {
ctx = new(csrfContext)
contextMap[req] = ctx
}
ctx.token = b64encode(maskToken(token))
return req
}
func ctxSetReason(req *http.Request, reason error) *http.Request {
cmMutex.Lock()
defer cmMutex.Unlock()
ctx, ok := contextMap[req]
if !ok {
panic("Reason should never be set when there's no token" +
" (context) yet.")
}
ctx.reason = reason
return req
}
func ctxClear(req *http.Request) {
cmMutex.Lock()
defer cmMutex.Unlock()
delete(contextMap, req)
}

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vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/crypto.go générée externe Fichier normal
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package nosurf
import (
"crypto/rand"
"io"
)
// Masks/unmasks the given data *in place*
// with the given key
// Slices must be of the same length, or oneTimePad will panic
func oneTimePad(data, key []byte) {
n := len(data)
if n != len(key) {
panic("Lengths of slices are not equal")
}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
data[i] ^= key[i]
}
}
func maskToken(data []byte) []byte {
if len(data) != tokenLength {
return nil
}
// tokenLength*2 == len(enckey + token)
result := make([]byte, 2*tokenLength)
// the first half of the result is the OTP
// the second half is the masked token itself
key := result[:tokenLength]
token := result[tokenLength:]
copy(token, data)
// generate the random token
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, key); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
oneTimePad(token, key)
return result
}
func unmaskToken(data []byte) []byte {
if len(data) != tokenLength*2 {
return nil
}
key := data[:tokenLength]
token := data[tokenLength:]
oneTimePad(token, key)
return token
}

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vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/exempt.go générée externe Fichier normal
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package nosurf
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
pathModule "path"
"reflect"
"regexp"
)
// Checks if the given request is exempt from CSRF checks.
// It checks the ExemptFunc first, then the exact paths,
// then the globs and finally the regexps.
func (h *CSRFHandler) IsExempt(r *http.Request) bool {
if h.exemptFunc != nil && h.exemptFunc(r) {
return true
}
path := r.URL.Path
if sContains(h.exemptPaths, path) {
return true
}
// then the globs
for _, glob := range h.exemptGlobs {
matched, err := pathModule.Match(glob, path)
if matched && err == nil {
return true
}
}
// finally, the regexps
for _, re := range h.exemptRegexps {
if re.MatchString(path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Exempts an exact path from CSRF checks
// With this (and other Exempt* methods)
// you should take note that Go's paths
// include a leading slash.
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptPath(path string) {
h.exemptPaths = append(h.exemptPaths, path)
}
// A variadic argument version of ExemptPath()
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptPaths(paths ...string) {
for _, v := range paths {
h.ExemptPath(v)
}
}
// Exempts URLs that match the specified glob pattern
// (as used by filepath.Match()) from CSRF checks
//
// Note that ExemptGlob() is unable to detect syntax errors,
// because it doesn't have a path to check it against
// and filepath.Match() doesn't report an error
// if the path is empty.
// If we find a way to check the syntax, ExemptGlob
// MIGHT PANIC on a syntax error in the future.
// ALWAYS check your globs for syntax errors.
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptGlob(pattern string) {
h.exemptGlobs = append(h.exemptGlobs, pattern)
}
// A variadic argument version of ExemptGlob()
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptGlobs(patterns ...string) {
for _, v := range patterns {
h.ExemptGlob(v)
}
}
// Accepts a regular expression string or a compiled *regexp.Regexp
// and exempts URLs that match it from CSRF checks.
//
// If the given argument is neither of the accepted values,
// or the given string fails to compile, ExemptRegexp() panics.
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptRegexp(re interface{}) {
var compiled *regexp.Regexp
switch re.(type) {
case string:
compiled = regexp.MustCompile(re.(string))
case *regexp.Regexp:
compiled = re.(*regexp.Regexp)
default:
err := fmt.Sprintf("%v isn't a valid type for ExemptRegexp()", reflect.TypeOf(re))
panic(err)
}
h.exemptRegexps = append(h.exemptRegexps, compiled)
}
// A variadic argument version of ExemptRegexp()
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptRegexps(res ...interface{}) {
for _, v := range res {
h.ExemptRegexp(v)
}
}
func (h *CSRFHandler) ExemptFunc(fn func(r *http.Request) bool) {
h.exemptFunc = fn
}

220
vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/handler.go générée externe Fichier normal
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// Package nosurf implements an HTTP handler that
// mitigates Cross-Site Request Forgery Attacks.
package nosurf
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
)
const (
// the name of CSRF cookie
CookieName = "csrf_token"
// the name of the form field
FormFieldName = "csrf_token"
// the name of CSRF header
HeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
// the HTTP status code for the default failure handler
FailureCode = 400
// Max-Age in seconds for the default base cookie. 365 days.
MaxAge = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
)
var safeMethods = []string{"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"}
// reasons for CSRF check failures
var (
ErrNoReferer = errors.New("A secure request contained no Referer or its value was malformed")
ErrBadReferer = errors.New("A secure request's Referer comes from a different Origin" +
" from the request's URL")
ErrBadToken = errors.New("The CSRF token in the cookie doesn't match the one" +
" received in a form/header.")
)
type CSRFHandler struct {
// Handlers that CSRFHandler wraps.
successHandler http.Handler
failureHandler http.Handler
// The base cookie that CSRF cookies will be built upon.
// This should be a better solution of customizing the options
// than a bunch of methods SetCookieExpiration(), etc.
baseCookie http.Cookie
// Slices of paths that are exempt from CSRF checks.
// They can be specified by...
// ...an exact path,
exemptPaths []string
// ...a regexp,
exemptRegexps []*regexp.Regexp
// ...or a glob (as used by path.Match()).
exemptGlobs []string
// ...or a custom matcher function
exemptFunc func(r *http.Request) bool
// All of those will be matched against Request.URL.Path,
// So they should take the leading slash into account
}
func defaultFailureHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "", FailureCode)
}
// Extracts the "sent" token from the request
// and returns an unmasked version of it
func extractToken(r *http.Request) []byte {
var sentToken string
// Prefer the header over form value
sentToken = r.Header.Get(HeaderName)
// Then POST values
if len(sentToken) == 0 {
sentToken = r.PostFormValue(FormFieldName)
}
// If all else fails, try a multipart value.
// PostFormValue() will already have called ParseMultipartForm()
if len(sentToken) == 0 && r.MultipartForm != nil {
vals := r.MultipartForm.Value[FormFieldName]
if len(vals) != 0 {
sentToken = vals[0]
}
}
return b64decode(sentToken)
}
// Constructs a new CSRFHandler that calls
// the specified handler if the CSRF check succeeds.
func New(handler http.Handler) *CSRFHandler {
baseCookie := http.Cookie{}
baseCookie.MaxAge = MaxAge
csrf := &CSRFHandler{successHandler: handler,
failureHandler: http.HandlerFunc(defaultFailureHandler),
baseCookie: baseCookie,
}
return csrf
}
// The same as New(), but has an interface return type.
func NewPure(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {
return New(handler)
}
func (h *CSRFHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r = addNosurfContext(r)
defer ctxClear(r)
w.Header().Add("Vary", "Cookie")
var realToken []byte
tokenCookie, err := r.Cookie(CookieName)
if err == nil {
realToken = b64decode(tokenCookie.Value)
}
// If the length of the real token isn't what it should be,
// it has either been tampered with,
// or we're migrating onto a new algorithm for generating tokens,
// or it hasn't ever been set so far.
// In any case of those, we should regenerate it.
//
// As a consequence, CSRF check will fail when comparing the tokens later on,
// so we don't have to fail it just yet.
if len(realToken) != tokenLength {
h.RegenerateToken(w, r)
} else {
ctxSetToken(r, realToken)
}
if sContains(safeMethods, r.Method) || h.IsExempt(r) {
// short-circuit with a success for safe methods
h.handleSuccess(w, r)
return
}
// if the request is secure, we enforce origin check
// for referer to prevent MITM of http->https requests
if r.URL.Scheme == "https" {
referer, err := url.Parse(r.Header.Get("Referer"))
// if we can't parse the referer or it's empty,
// we assume it's not specified
if err != nil || referer.String() == "" {
ctxSetReason(r, ErrNoReferer)
h.handleFailure(w, r)
return
}
// if the referer doesn't share origin with the request URL,
// we have another error for that
if !sameOrigin(referer, r.URL) {
ctxSetReason(r, ErrBadReferer)
h.handleFailure(w, r)
return
}
}
// Finally, we check the token itself.
sentToken := extractToken(r)
if !verifyToken(realToken, sentToken) {
ctxSetReason(r, ErrBadToken)
h.handleFailure(w, r)
return
}
// Everything else passed, handle the success.
h.handleSuccess(w, r)
}
// handleSuccess simply calls the successHandler.
// Everything else, like setting a token in the context
// is taken care of by h.ServeHTTP()
func (h *CSRFHandler) handleSuccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.successHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// Same applies here: h.ServeHTTP() sets the failure reason, the token,
// and only then calls handleFailure()
func (h *CSRFHandler) handleFailure(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.failureHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// Generates a new token, sets it on the given request and returns it
func (h *CSRFHandler) RegenerateToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) string {
token := generateToken()
h.setTokenCookie(w, r, token)
return Token(r)
}
func (h *CSRFHandler) setTokenCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token []byte) {
// ctxSetToken() does the masking for us
ctxSetToken(r, token)
cookie := h.baseCookie
cookie.Name = CookieName
cookie.Value = b64encode(token)
http.SetCookie(w, &cookie)
}
// Sets the handler to call in case the CSRF check
// fails. By default it's defaultFailureHandler.
func (h *CSRFHandler) SetFailureHandler(handler http.Handler) {
h.failureHandler = handler
}
// Sets the base cookie to use when building a CSRF token cookie
// This way you can specify the Domain, Path, HttpOnly, Secure, etc.
func (h *CSRFHandler) SetBaseCookie(cookie http.Cookie) {
h.baseCookie = cookie
}

12
vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/handler_go17.go générée externe Fichier normal
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// +build go1.7
package nosurf
import (
"context"
"net/http"
)
func addNosurfContext(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), nosurfKey, &csrfContext{}))
}

9
vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/handler_legacy.go générée externe Fichier normal
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
// +build !go1.7
package nosurf
import "net/http"
func addNosurfContext(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
return r
}

105
vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/token.go générée externe Fichier normal
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package nosurf
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"io"
)
const (
tokenLength = 32
)
/*
There are two types of tokens.
* The unmasked "real" token consists of 32 random bytes.
It is stored in a cookie (base64-encoded) and it's the
"reference" value that sent tokens get compared to.
* The masked "sent" token consists of 64 bytes:
32 byte key used for one-time pad masking and
32 byte "real" token masked with the said key.
It is used as a value (base64-encoded as well)
in forms and/or headers.
Upon processing, both tokens are base64-decoded
and then treated as 32/64 byte slices.
*/
// A token is generated by returning tokenLength bytes
// from crypto/rand
func generateToken() []byte {
bytes := make([]byte, tokenLength)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, bytes); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return bytes
}
func b64encode(data []byte) string {
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(data)
}
func b64decode(data string) []byte {
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(data)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return decoded
}
// VerifyToken verifies the sent token equals the real one
// and returns a bool value indicating if tokens are equal.
// Supports masked tokens. realToken comes from Token(r) and
// sentToken is token sent unusual way.
func VerifyToken(realToken, sentToken string) bool {
r := b64decode(realToken)
if len(r) == 2*tokenLength {
r = unmaskToken(r)
}
s := b64decode(sentToken)
if len(s) == 2*tokenLength {
s = unmaskToken(s)
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(r, s) == 1
}
func verifyToken(realToken, sentToken []byte) bool {
realN := len(realToken)
sentN := len(sentToken)
// sentN == tokenLength means the token is unmasked
// sentN == 2*tokenLength means the token is masked.
if realN == tokenLength && sentN == 2*tokenLength {
return verifyMasked(realToken, sentToken)
} else {
return false
}
}
// Verifies the masked token
func verifyMasked(realToken, sentToken []byte) bool {
sentPlain := unmaskToken(sentToken)
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(realToken, sentPlain) == 1
}
func checkForPRNG() {
// Check that cryptographically secure PRNG is available
// In case it's not, panic.
buf := make([]byte, 1)
_, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, buf)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("crypto/rand is unavailable: Read() failed with %#v", err))
}
}
func init() {
checkForPRNG()
}

25
vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/utils.go générée externe Fichier normal
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package nosurf
import (
"net/url"
)
func sContains(slice []string, s string) bool {
// checks if the given slice contains the given string
for _, v := range slice {
if v == s {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Checks if the given URLs have the same origin
// (that is, they share the host, the port and the scheme)
func sameOrigin(u1, u2 *url.URL) bool {
// we take pointers, as url.Parse() returns a pointer
// and http.Request.URL is a pointer as well
// Host is either host or host:port
return (u1.Scheme == u2.Scheme && u1.Host == u2.Host)
}